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U nder the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act of 1975 ("DD Act"),' the federal government
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No.
94-103, 89 Stat. 496 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083
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instituted a grant program to distribute federal funds to assist states in
providing services for people with disabilities.2 In return for the financial
assistance, the DD Act required each state to establish a Protection and
Advocacy ("P&A") system3 to investigate reports of abuse and neglect of
people with developmental disabilities, to remedy rights violations, and
to provide other advocacy services. The programs providing these
services are known as Protection and Advocacy of Developmentally
Disabled programs ("PADD"). These protections were later extended to
people with mental illness under the Protection and Advocacy of
Mentally Ill Individuals Act of 1986 ("PAMII" - which began the
"PAIMI" program),4 then to people with disabilities generally, under the
Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights program ("PAIR"). 5 Both
the PADD and PAIMI programs are particularly concerned with the rights
(1994)).
2 The grants are provided to the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the
Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands and the Republic of Palau (until the compact of Free
Associations with Palau takes effect). See 42 U.S.C. § 6025(a) (1994).
' See id. § 6000(b)(2).
The purpose of this chapter is to assure that individuals with develop-
mental disabilities and their families participate in the design of and
have access to culturally competent services ... through -
(2) support to protection and advocacy systems in each State to
protect the legal and human rights of individuals with developmental
disabilities ....
Id. at § 6000(b)(2) (emphasis added).
' Protection and Advocacy of Mentally Ill Individuals Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-319, 100 Stat. 478 (codified as amendedat 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10851
(1994)). While the statute was entitled PAMII, the programs begun by PAMII
have been renamed the Protection and Advocacy of Individuals with Mental
Illness ("PAIMI") program.
' Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106 Stat.
4430 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994)). In 1994-95, P&A
programs served more than 700,000 people with disabilities. See ADVOCACY
TRAINING, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTER, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEMS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE P&A SYSTEM
1995-1996 1 (1996) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT OF THE P&A SYSTEM].
"Collectively, P&As are the largest provider of legally-based advocacy services
to people with disabilities in the United States. As many as one million people
with disabilities may benefit in the future as a result of 123 class actions
currently being pursued by P&As." Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
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of people living in institutions and other facilities.6 States integrate these
PADD and PAIMI programs into one P&A system.7
As the subject of abuse and neglect investigations, however, many
facilities have resisted P&A investigative and advocacy efforts by
impeding the P&A's access to facilities, the people who reside in them,
and pertinent institutional records. 8 Frequently P&As have been side-
tracked from pursuing substantive advocacy efforts in order to resolve
these basic access problems.9 In an effort to overcome the access
obstacle, the Department of Health and Human Services recently
promulgated new DD Act Regulations ° specifying with greater particu-
larity the parameters of P&A access authority. 1
Part I of this Note examines the history of the P&As. Part II
describes the development of access problems, and Part III analyzes
attempts at judicial resolution. Parts IV and V of the Note explore the
new DD Regulations to determine whether they resolve access issues. Part
VI discusses alternative solutions and examines penalties that might be
imposed on states that do not ensure meaningful access for their P&As.
The Note concludes with a brief look at the ramifications of the new DD
Regulations on future P&A investigative and advocacy efforts.
6 See JOHN PARRY, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: A PRIMER 86 (1995). See
generally 42 U.S.C. § 10801 (1994) (Congress was concernedwith "neglect, lack
of treatment, adequate nutrition, clothing, health care and adequate discharge
planning."). See also ANNUAL REPORT OF THE P&A SYSTEM, supra note 5, at
1. Since the inception of the P&As, the quality and amount of services available
to people with disabilities has increased tremendously. See id. As a result, fewer
people with mental illness and developmental disabilities reside in institutional
settings; however, "[a] fairly large number of persons with mental illness (and
developmental disabilities) continue to reside in institutional settings - and over
one-third of the PAIMI program cases continue to be related to allegations of
serious abuse and neglect in these environments." Id. at 12. Thus, P&As continue
to be committed to the mission of protecting the greatest number of people with
disabilities from abuse and neglect through advocacy and legal (including
class-action) efforts. See id. at 1-2, 12.
See PARRY, supra note 6.
8 See infra notes 36-65 and accompanying text.
9 See ADVOCACY TRAINING/TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTER, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEMS COMMENTS ON
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES' NOTICE OF PROPOSED
RULEMAKING TO IMPLEMENT THE DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES PROGRAM 3
[hereinafter COMMENTS ON PROPOSED DD REGULATIONS].
"0 Developmental Disabilities Program, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,142 (1996) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 1385-88). Effective date is October 30, 1996.
" See id.
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I. THE GENESIS OF THE PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEM
On October 1, 1974, New York's Willowbrook State School went on
trial for its appalling treatment of people with mental retardation. 2
Pretrial testimony revealed that people living at Willowbrook had been
forced to tolerate inhumane conditions. During the trial, more than fifty
witnesses reported that residents were beaten and bruised, and endured
"maggot-infested wounds, assembly-line bathing, inadequate medical care,
cruel and inappropriate use of restraints and insufficient provision of
clothing."' 3 Residents had even been deliberately exposed to hepatitis
for purposes of medical experimentation. 4 Such treatment caused the
residents to deteriorate physically, mentally, and emotionally as a result
of neglect and frequent injuries.' 5
Congress was deeply "[d]isturbed by the inhumane and despicable
conditions at New York's Willowbrook State School for persons with
developmental disabilities,"' 6 and as a result passed the DD Act requir-
ing states seeking federal aid for service delivery 7 to establish a system
12 See PAUL R. FRIEDMAN, THE RIGHTS OF MENTALLY RETARDED
PERSONS: AN AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION HANDBOOK 65 (1976).
13 Id.
14 See Harriet A. Washington, Human Guinea Pigs, ETHNIC NEWSWATCH,
Oct. 31, 1994, at 24.
[R]esearchers who wanted to study hepatitis decided in 1973 to give
their mentally retarded charges hepatitis, both through injections and
through another even more disgusting route. Dr. Cyril Wecht, coroner
of Allegheny County in Pennsylvania and past president of the
American College of Legal Medicine, explains the experiment in the
book, Legal Medicine: "They took retarded youngsters, with no
informed consent and most probably without any kind of consent, gave
them orally a fecal extract containing hepatitis virus to see what the
medical results would be."
The result: Many of them contracted hepatitis.
Id.
'5 See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357
F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). The court noted that "[t]he loss of an eye, the
breaking of teeth, the loss of part of an ear bitten off by another resident, and
frequent bruises and scalp wounds were typical of the testimony." Id. at 756.
6 Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program v. J.S. Tarwater Development
Ctr., 97 F.3d 492, 494 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
'" States choosing to participate have received millions of dollars of federal
financial assistance for services for people with disabilities. See Clarence J.
Sundram, Patient Advocacy in the United States, 23 INT'L J. MENTAL HEALTH
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to protect the legal and human rights of vulnerable people with develop-
mental disabilities. 8 To make certain that these protections became a
reality, the P&A system was initiated to investigate reports of abuse and
neglect of people with developmental disabilities, to remedy rights
violations, and to provide other advocacy services. 9
3, 6-8 (1995).
"s Before 1978, the Act defined "developmental disabilities" as mental
retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, autism, and certain neurological disorders.
See PARRY, supra note 6, at 5. The 1978 Amendments to the Act replaced these
specific disabilities with a functional definition: people who are five years of age
or older and have a severe chronic disability as the result of, or attributable to,
a mental or physical impairment that is manifested before the age of 22. The
disability must be likely to continue indefinitely and must result in "substantial
functional limitations in three or more areas," 42 U.S.C. § 6001(8), of major life
activities such as self-care, ability to receive and express language, learning, or
the capacity for independent living. See id.
'9 See 42 U.S.C. § 6042(a) (1994):
In order for a State to receive an allotment under subchapter II of
this chapter -
(1) the State must have in effect a system to protect and
advocate the rights of individuals with developmental disabilities;
(2) such system must -
(A) have the authority to -
(i) pursue legal, administrative, and other appropriate
remedies or approaches to ensure the protection of, and
advocacy for, the rights of such individuals within the
State who are or who may be eligible for treatment,
services, or habilitation, or who are being considered for
a change in living arrangements, with particular attention
to members of ethnic and racial minority groups; and
(ii) provide information on and referral to programs
and services addressing the needs of individuals with
developmental disabilities;
(B) have the authority to investigate incidents of abuse and
neglect of individuals with developmental disabilities if the
incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable
cause to believe that the incidents occurred;
(G) be independent of any agency which provides treat-
ment, services, or habilitation to individuals with developmen-
tal disabilities;
(H) have access at reasonable times and locations to any
resident who is an individual with a developmental disability
[VOL. 85960
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About ten years later, after congressional hearings substantiated
severe, widespread abuse and neglect in state psychiatric facilities,2"
Congress expanded the mandate of the P&A system to include services
in a facility that is providing services, supports, and other
assistance to such a resident;
(I) have access to all records of -
(i) any individual with developmental disabilities who
is a client of the system if such individual, or the legal
guardian, conservator, or other legal representative of such
individual, has authorized the system to have such access;
(ii) any individual with developmental disabilities -
(I) who, by reason of such individual's mental or
physical condition, is unable to authorize the system
to have such access;
(II) who does not have a legal guardian, conserva-
tor, or other legal representative, or for whom the
legal guardian is the State; and
(III) with respect to whom a complaint has been
received by the system or with respect to whom as a
result of monitoring or other activities there is proba-
ble cause to believe that such individual has been
subject to abuse or neglect; and
(iii) any person [individual] with a developmental
disability who has a legal guardian, conservator, or other
legal representative with respect to whom a complaint has
been received by the system or with respect to whom there
is probable cause to believe the health or safety of the
individual is in serious and immediate jeopardy whenever
(I) such representatives have been contacted by
such system upon receipt of the name and address of
such representatives;
(II) such system has offered assistance to such
representatives to resolve the situation; and
(III) such representatives have failed or refused to
act on behalf of the individual ....
20 132 CONG. REc. H204-03 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Trent Lott (R-Miss.)). Representative Lott noted, "[t]his legislation is the result
of committee findings that the mentally ill have been subjected to serious abuse
and neglect in institutions, including physical, emotional and sexual abuse." See
generally S. REP. No. 99-109, at 2 (1985) (documenting the need for legislation).
The staff investigations, which lead to the legislation, covered 31 state-operated
facilities in 12 states in which people with developmental disabilities, mental
retardation, and mental illness resided. See id. at 2.
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for people with mental illness under PAMII.2' Later, Congress extended
2 Congress intended that the PAMII Act "would provide for the same kind
of assistance for institutionalized mentally ill patients as that which is now
available for mentally disabled patients. It would do that by expanding the
mandate of state protection and advocacy agencies to include services for the
mentally ill." 132 CoNG. REc. H204-03 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1986) (statement of
Rep. Anthony Beilenson (D-Cal.)). P&As under PAIMI have many of the same
rights and functions as P&As under PADD. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 10805 (1994).
But see infra note 95 and accompanying text.
See also 42 U.S.C. § 10805 (1994) (PAMII Act):
(a) A system established in a State under section 103 [42 U.S.C. §
10803] to protect and advocate the rights of individuals with mental
illness shall -
(1) have the authority to -
(A) investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of mentally ill
individuals if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is
probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred;
(B) pursue administrative, legal and other appropriate
remedies to ensure the protection of individuals with mental
illness who are receiving care or treatment in the State; and
pursue administrative, legal, and other remedies on behalf of
an individual who -
(I) was an individual with mental illness; and
(ii) is a resident of the State,
but only with respect to matters which occur within 90 days
after the date of discharge of such individual from a facility
providing care or treatment;
(2) be independent of any agency in the State which provides
treatment or services (other than advocacy services) to mentally ill
individuals;
(3) have access to facilities in the State providing care or
treatment;
(4) in accordance with section 106 (42 U.S.C. § 10806), have
access to all records of -
(A) any individual who is a client of the system if such
individual, or the legal guardian, conservator, or other legal
representative of such individual, has authorized the system to
have such access; and
(B) any individual (including an individual who has died
or whose whereabouts are unknown) -
(I) who by reason of the mental or physical condition
of such individual is unable to authorize the system to
have such access;
(ii) who does not have a legal guardian, conservator,
or other legal representative, or for whom the legal
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protection to people with other disabilities under the PAIR program.22
guardian is the State; and
(iii) with respect to whom a complaint has been
received by the system or with respect to whom as a result
of monitoring or other activities (either of which result
from a complaint or other evidence) there is probable
cause to believe that such individual has been subject to
abuse or neglect; and
(C) any individual with a mental illness, who has a legal
guardian, conservator, or other legal representative, with
respect to whom a complaint has been received by the system
or with respect to whom there is probably cause to believe the
health or safety of the individual is in serious and immediate
jeopardy, whenever -
(i) such representative has been contacted by such
system upon receipt of the name and address of such
representative;
(ii) such system has offered assistance to such repre-
sentative to resolve the situation; and
(iii) such representative has failed or refused to act on
behalf of the individual.
22 Under 29 U.S.C. § 794e(a)(2) the PAIR program authorizes P&As to
serve people with disabilities who are not eligible under the PADD Program
(developmental disability) or under the PAIMI Program (a resident of a mental
health facility or within 90 days of release from a mental health facility). P&As
under PAIR have many of the same functions and rights as P&As under PADD.
See id. § 794e(f)(2) (stating that the PAIR system shall "have the same general
authorities .. , as set forth in... the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act.").
See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 794e(a)(2), 794e(f)(2)-(3) (1994) (PAIR program):
(a) The purpose of this section is to support a system in each State
to protect the legal and human rights of individuals with disabilities
who -
(2) are ineligible for protection and advocacy programs under
... the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act [citation omitted] and the Protection and Advocacy for
Mentally Ill Individuals Act of 1986 [citation omitted].
(f) [The PAIR system shall]
(2) have the same general authorities, including access to
records and program income, as are set forth in ... the Develop-
mental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act [citations
omitted];
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II. PRELUDE TO THE PROBLEM:
CHALLENGES TO P&A AUTHORITY
A. Why Access Authority Is Needed
Since 1975, the DD Act has done much to move service providers
and people with developmental disabilities from an institutional frame-
work toward a community framework in which people have the right to
live, work, and play.23 However, many people with developmental
disabilities still live in facilities24 where they are vulnerable to abuse and
neglect.2" Frequently, the people who have the greatest need for protec-
tion and advocacy services are those least able to communicate with the
P&A system.26
Similarly, people with serious mental illness often are unable to
protect themselves from even the most severe abuse and, to make matters
worse, the nature of mental illness exacerbates abuse and neglect.27
(3) have the authority to pursue legal, administrative, and other
appropriate remedies or approaches to ensure the protection of, and
advocacy for, the rights of such individuals within the State who
are ineligible for protection and advocacy programs under ... the
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act
[citation omitted] and the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill
Individuals Act of 1986 ....
23 See Testimony of Steve Eidelman, Consortium of Citizens with
Disabilities, S. REP. No. 103-120, at 12 (1993).
24 The facilities covered by P&As include large institutions such as
"hospitals, nursing homes, community residential facilities, board and care
homes, shelters for the homeless, prisons and jails." Sundram, supra note 17, at
5.
25 See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID: OVERSIGHT OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED § 2
(1996) [hereinafter OVERSIGHT OF INSTITUTIONS]. Because the impairments of
those with developmental disabilities "often limit their ability to communicate
concerns and many lack family members to advocate on their behalf, they are
highly vulnerable to abuse, neglect, or other forms of mistreatment." Id. § 2.
26 See S. REP. No. 103-120, at 14-15 (1993) (testimony of Sara
Wiggins-Mitchell); cf. PARRY, supra note 6, at 12 (stating that clients who have
profound disabilities or who are heavily medicated "may be unable to express
their desires, voice their complaints, or argue for their interests").
27 Congress found that individuals with mental illness "are vulnerable to
abuse and serious injury" as well as "neglect, including lack of treatment,
adequate nutrition, clothing, health care, and adequate discharge planning." 42
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Because mental retardation and mental illness may interfere with a person's
ability to communicate incidents of abuse or neglect to the P&A, whether the
P&A has free access to people residing in facilities, as well as to records
pertaining to them, may have life or death consequences.
B. P&. Investigations Are Hampered by Challenges to P&As'
Authority to Gain Access to Residents, Facilities, and Records
Although the P&As generally are empowered by the federal statute to
investigate and pursue legal action on behalf of those victimized by abuse and
neglect,28 P&A effectiveness in doing so has been plagued by the absence
of detailed authoritative statutory and regulatory standards. 9 Specifically,
P&A authority to conduct investigations and to gain access to records,
facilities, and people receiving treatment has been the subject of repeated
challenges.30 When P&As are denied timely access to information, their
ability to promptly investigate suspected abuse and neglect is greatly
diminished. This interference with the investigative process allows "facilities
the time to conceal evidence, change medical records, coordinate stones
among witnesses and/or impose a code of silence upon staff."'3
U.S.C. § 10801(a)(1), (3) (1994). Further, Congress found that before P&A
services were extended to people with mental illness, "[s]tate systems for
monitoring compliance with respect to the rights of individuals with mental
illness vary widely and are frequently madequate."Id. § 10801(a)(4). See also
132 CONG. REc. H204-03 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1986) (statement of Rep. Henry A.
Waxman (D-Cal.)); 131 CONG. REC. S4508-01 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1985)
(statement of Sen. Weicker (R-Conn.)) (relating the story of a man living at a
state facility being forced to live three years in a shower stall wearing only a thin
cotton sheet, and the story of a boy who could walk and feed himself when he
entered the state facility but could do neither four years later after having been
injured 124 times).
28 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6042(a)(2) (the "DD Act"), 10805(a) (PAMII); 29
U.S.C. § 794e(f)(2)-(3) (PAIR).
29 The new DD Regulations revise the former (45 C.F.R. Part 1386) which
contained only sketchy guidance as to access parameters. Although the PAIMI
program was in existence for several years, no rules had been promulgated. See
Requirements Applicable to Protection and Advocacy of Individuals with Mental
Illness, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,367 (1994) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 51) (rules
were proposed Dec. 14, 1994, to provide basic definitions and to clarify
requirements of the PAMII Act). The PAIR rules at 34 C.F.R. 31 offer no
guidance on access parameters.
30 See infra notes 36-65 and accompanying text.
31 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE P&A SYsTEM, supra note 5, at 8.
1996-97]
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As a result, since the inception of the P&A system twenty years ago,
"T&A resources needlessly have been diverted from pursuing substantive
advocacy [ ] to fighting battles [over] procedural issues."32 In response
to this and other concerns, the Deparlment of Health and Human Services
("THS") Administration on Developmental Disabilities ("ADD") recently
promulgated final revised rules for PADD Programs,33 adding a rule section
designed to clarify P&A authority to access records, facilities, and individu-
als.34 In addition, the new regulations have attempted to strengthen existing
rule language in an effort to more thoroughly explicate the parameters of
P&A authority 
35
C. Overmzew of the Challenges to P&A Access
In order to understand whether the new DD regulations will resolve
access problems and make P&A investigations more effective, an overview
of case law challenging P&A access authority is necessary Government-
operated facilities have a history of obstructing P&A investigative efforts.
36
Private facilities37 have also demed P&As access by alleging that P&A
authority does not extend to them.38 Both private and government-operated
facilities have needlessly impaired the ability of advocates to act on behalf of
people with disabilities by imposing procedural delays that '"may cause a
violation of rights to go unaddressed until it is too late to remedy "'
32 COMMENTS ON PROPOSED DD REGULATIONS, supra note 9, at 3.
33 See Developmental Disabilities Program, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,142 (1996) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. Pts. 1385-88).
31 See id. at 51,158 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1386.22).
31 See infra Part IV.B.2 (notes 111-38 and accompanying text).
36 See infra notes 44-65 and accompanying text.
31 P&A access authority extends to private facilities, although some private
facilities (nursing homes, privately run congregate living facilities, and group
homes) have argued that P&A authority covers only public facilities. See
Developmental Disabilities Program, 61 Fed. Reg. at 51,155-56 (to be codified
at 45 C.F.R. § 1386.19) (P&As have authority to conduct full investigations of
facilities defined as "any setting that provides care"); see also Maryland
Disability Law Ctr., Inc. v Mount Waslungton Pediatric Hosp., 664 A.2d 16, 22
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (holding the DD Act does not limit delivery of
protection and advocacy services to people in state hospitals and therefore private
hospitals can be investigated).
38 See Mount Washington, 664 A.2d at 22.
'9 Robbins v Budke, 739 F Supp. 1479, 1488 (D.N.M. 1990) (holding that
medical centers' policies limiting access of patient advocacy group was
unconstitutional and violated purposes of PAMII).
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Obviously, a P&A needs prompt access to extensive information,
witnesses, staff, and clients in order to conduct an abuse investigation. In
large part, the repeated resistance of facilities to P&A access has been caused
by the P&As' watchdog status. P&As frequently are at odds with facilities
over the treatment of clients.40 The situation has been further complicated
by sketchy statutory and rule gidance on access authority."
Although facility managers "have the right to impose reasonable
restrictions on all visitors to the facility state officials may not enforce
regulations which render the protection and advocacy system less than
reasonably effective. '42 Thus, courts have broadly construed P&A access
authority in investigating abuse and neglect allegations.4" Even m the
absence of suspected abuse or neglect, courts have held that facilities must
provide the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of residents' guard-
ians.' This ensures that the people with disabilities can have full access to
the P&A's services,4" and that the P&A may contact guardians to obtain
consent to represent residents or discuss problems.46
40 See Telephone Interview with Barbara Cotter, Senior Advocate Coordina-
tor, PADD Program, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (Oct. 7, 1996)
(discussing the fact that because P&As frequently are irritants to state agencies,
there is little receptivity to access to clients and records).
4' See Telephone Interview with Gary Gross, Director of Legal Services,
Advocacy Trammg/Techmcal Assistance Center, National Association of
Protection and Advocacy Systems (Oct. 16, 1996) (stating that needless litigation
and disputes could have been avoided with clear authority).
42 Mississippi Protection & Advocacy Sys., Inc. v Cotten, No. Civ A. J87-
0503(L), 1989 WL 224953, at *9 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 7, 1989) (unpublished
opimon), aff'd, 929 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1991).
4 See PARRY, supra note 6, at 86-87
"See, e.g., Robbins, 739 F Supp. at 1489 (holding that the defendant
institution must post guardian information where P&As can find it during regular
business hours).
41 See Mississippi Protection & Advocacy Sys., Inc. v Cotten, 929 F.2d
1054, 1059 (5th Cir. 1991):
The state cannot satisfy the requirements of the DDA by establishing a
protection and advocacy system which has [authority to access people
with developmental disabilities] in theory, but then taking action which
prevents the system from exercising that authority. Defendants'
restrictive practices have reduced MP&A's authority to the point that it
can offer Boswell residents only a fraction of the services to which they
are entitled.
Id. at 1059 (quoting Cotten, 1989 WL 224953 at *9).
46 See Robbins, 739 F Supp. at 1489
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Courts have held that when a P&A receives a complaint or has pro-
bable cause to believe that abuse or neglect has occurred,4 it is en-
titled to request and receive the names and the records of the people who
are the subjects of the complaint if they have no guardian and cannot
consent48 A P&A also has the right to receive the names of people who
may have died as a result of abuse or neglect, either m response to a
complaint49 or m order to conduct a mortality review at a particular faci-
lity.5
0
The P&A is not required to obtain a judicial determination of probable
cause before initiating its investigation.1 Courts have also held that a P&A
has liberal authority to conduct general monitoring activities, regardless of
whether the P&A suspects abuse or neglect or has received a complaint.52
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 6042(a)(2)(B) (1994).
48 See Robbins, 739 F Supp. at 1489; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6042(a)(2)(I)(ii)
(1994) (DD Act), § 10805(a)(4)(B) (1994) (PAMII Act); 29 U.S.C. § 794e(f)(2)
(1994) (PAIR program).
" See Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program v. J.S. Tarwater Develop-
mental Ctr., 894 F Supp. 424, 428 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (holding that even though
the DD Act does not specifically authorize P&A access to "an individual who
has died" as does the PAMIlI Act, Congress could not have meant to "eliminate
from scrutiny the most serious abuses that result m death in a statute de-
signed to ensure advocacy for the rights of people with disabilities"), affd, 97
F.3d 492 (1 lth Cir. 1996); see also 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(4)(B) (1994) (P&As
may access records of a person who has died or whose whereabouts are
unknown).
" See Letter from Bob Williams, Commissioner, Administration on
Developmental Disabilities, to Ellen M. Saideman, Staff Attorney, Advocacy
Center for Persons with Disabilities, Inc., 2-3 (Oct. 28, 1994) (agency Advisory
Opimon) (stating that the P&A had authority to obtain the records of all residents
who had died at a particular facility within the last two years in order to conduct
mortality reviews).
"' See Maryland Disability Law Ctr., Inc. v. Mount Washington Pediatric
Hosp., 664 A.2d 16, 24 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (holding that the "initial
determination of probable cause to undertake an investigation must be made by
[the P&A]").
2 See Robbins, 739 F Supp. at 1487-88 (holding that the P&A has a
general, though not unlimited, right to observe and monitor conditions of a
facility; the facility may not hinder fis right by insisting the P&A give advance
notice before monitoring, and the facility cannot limit access by requiring an
administrative chaperon).
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A P&A should be able to speak freely and informally with residents53 and
staff.5
4
Thus, P&As repeatedly have had to pursue judicial relief to enforce their
access authority, even though P&A access rights are expressly or implicitly
authorized by statute. Recurring problems have necessitated litigation to
ensure that P&As can obtain guardian information,55 private meetings with
residents, 6 and the opportunity to talk freely with witnesses and staff."
Yet even with extensive litigation, these basic access problems may not be
resolved.
HI. PROBLEMS W1TH JUDICIAL SOLuTIONS
A. Access to Records
1. West Virginia Advocates, Inc.
v Appalachia Community Health Center
In some cases, judicial efforts to solve access problems have brought
about conflicting results. For example, P&As may access client records
upon the client's authorization under both the DD Act" and the PAMII
Act.59 Yet in West Virginia Advocates, Inc. v. Appalachian Community
Health Center,6" the Supreme Court of West Virginia held that P&A
" See generally Mississippi Protection& AdvocacySys., Inc. v Cotten, 929
F.2d 1054, 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding the center's policy of requiring
the P&A to notify the Department of Mental Health's legal department before
speaking with a resident violated the DD Act).
' See Robbins, 739 F Supp. at 1488 (holding that facility's practice of not
allowing P&A to talk freely with staff members served no legitimate purpose).
5 See, e.g., Robbins, 739 F Supp at 1489.
56 See, e.g., Mississippi Protection & Advocacy Sys., Inc. v Cotten, No.
Civ. A. J87-0503(L), 1989 WL 224953, at *8 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 7, 1989)
(unpublished opinion) (noting that m-person contact with a P&A's staff is the
only way many residents of state-run facilities can report problems to the P&A
because of their developmental disabilities and the restrictions of living in an
institution), aff'd, 929 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Robbms, 739 F Supp.
at 1489.
" See, e.g., Robbins, 739 F Supp at 1488-89.
5s 42 U.S.C. § 6042(a)(2)(I)(i) (1994).
59 Id. § 10805(a)(4)(A).
60 West Virginia Advocates, Inc. v. Appalachian Community Health Ctr.,
447 S.E.2d 606 (W Va. 1994).
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access to a client's records depends on whether the person "is mentally
capable of granting such authorization"'" to the P&A and required a
competency hearing to make that determination.
6 2
Conversely, in Michigan Protection & Advocacy Service, Inc. v.
Miller,6" the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan
simply stated that, because the DD Act empowers P&As to investigate
abuse, P&As "must have the power to access the records of all individu-
als with developmental disabilities who are clients of the service or are
the subject of a complaint to the service."' The court imposed no
extra-statutory requirement of a competency hearing, as did the West
Virginia Supreme Court.65
2. Alabama Disabilities Advocacy
Program v J.S. Tarwater Developmental Center
Other issues which at first appeared to be resolved judicially have
later been re-litigated, wasting P&A resources and precious time during
which evidence may have been tampered with or destroyed. In Mississip-
pi Protection and Advocacy, Inc. v. Cotten,66 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth District determined that an anonymous tip received by the
Mississippi P&A about a resident's death during a disciplinary restraming
was sufficient to warrant a death investigation by the Mississippi P&A.67
61 Id. at 612.
62 The court stated that relevant factors include the "individual's capability
to understand the implication of granting such authority to the system, the
individual's ability to express preferences and personal needs, as well as the
individual's competency." Id. The court stated that a county commission order
finding an individual legally incompetent "by itself, is insufficient to preclude the
state designatedprotection and advocacy system from accessinga developmental-
ly disabled individual's records "Id.
63 Michigan Protection & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v Miller, 849 F Supp. 1202
(W.D. Mich. 1994).
64 Id. at 1206-07
65 See id. The statement in Miller is actually dictum becausethe issue facing
the court was not consent, but rather just a question of access to records m
general. However, when listing the requirements of the act, an extra-judicial
hearing was not on the list. See id.
66 Mississippi Protection & Advocacy Sys., Inc. v Cotten, 929 F.2d 1054
(5th Cir. 1991).
67 See id. at 1056; see also Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program v. J.S.
Tarwater Developmental Ctr., 97 F.3d 492, 498 (1 lth Cir. 1996) (citing the Fifth
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Subsequently, however, the sufficiency of an anonymous telephone tip to
the Alabama P&A was hotly contested in Alabama Disabilities Advocacy
Program v. JS. Tarwater Developmental Center 6
In Tarwater, the Alabama P&A received an anonymous phone call
about two deaths that had occurred under suspicious circumstances in a
state-run developmental center.69 The Alabama P&A promptly sought
the pertinent records regarding the two deaths, but the facilities refused
to release the records.70 The facility asserted that complainants must
"divulge their names or reduce their allegations to writing and sworn
testimony or make charges of a particular nature" before the facility was
required to turn over records to the P&A.
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama held that
the state could not impose such disclosure requirements because they
would "dilute the [DD] Act and too narrowly construe the complaint
requirement."' Although the Alabama P&A prevailed, much time was
lost in the process: more than six months elapsed from when the Alabama
P&A received the abuse and neglect complaint to when the state turned
over the records so that the P&A could begin its death investigation.7"
The Tarwater case is not atypical of the type of access litigation
P&As have had to undertake in order to carry out their statutory mandate.
Agencies charged with protecting people from abuse and neglect
Circuit's decision in Cotten for the proposition that anonymous complaints are
commonplace for investigatory agencies and that the DD Act does not require
anything more formal), aff'g 894 F Supp. 424 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
68 Alabama Disabilities AdvocacyProgram v J.S. Tarwater Developmental
Ctr., 894 F Supp. 424, 428-29 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (declining to place any specific
requirements on the type of complaint required under the DD Act), affd, 97 F.3d
492 (1lth Cir. 1996).
69 See id. at 426. The "state" is the Alabama Department of Mental
Health/Mental Retardation ("DvH/MR"). The developmental centers are part of
DMH/MR.
70 See id.
71 Id. at 429.
72 See Brief for Appellees at 3, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program v.
J.S. Tarwater Developmental Ctr., 97 F.3d 492 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-6584).
The Alabama P&A received its complaint on February 24, 1995, and immediate-
ly began informal attempts to gain access to pertinent records. See id. When
informal efforts proved fruitless, the Alabama P&A filed a complaint for a
temporary restraining order against DMH/MR on March 21, 1995. See id. at 2.
On July 6, 1995, Judge Myron Thompson enjoined DMI/MR from refusing to
release the requested records. See td. at 2-3. DMH/MR finally released the
records after its motion for a stay was demed on August 7, 1995. See id. at 3.
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commonly consider an anonymous complaint sufficient to trigger an
investigation." A P&A's authority to request records based upon an
anonymous abuse complaint is so fundamental to its ability to imtiate an
abuse or death investigation that no P&A should still have to litigate the
issue twenty years after the passage of the DD Act.
B. Access to Facilities and Residents
1. Mississippi Protection and Advocacy, Inc. v Cotten
Another basic P&A right that has been the subject of repeated
challenges is access to facilities and residents.74 In Mississippi Protec-
tion and Advocacy, Inc. v. Cotten,7" for example, the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi in 1989 set parameters for
reasonable access that allowed the Mississippi P&A to have "access to
and the most effective commumcation possible"76 with residents at the
Boswell Retardation Center during the day at mealtimes, break times, and
any time residents were not working and m private rooms." Further-
more, the resulting judgment held that the P&A had the right to tour
sheltered workshops and, if the P&A suspected abuse during mght hours
or at a workshop location, it could also investigate after giving notice
even if the facility had a conflicting event scheduled."
In 1991, the Fifth Circuit upheld the court's order.79 Yet, in 1996,
the Mississippi P&A again was forced to contend with Boswell over the
71 See Cotten, 929 F.2d at 1056.
' See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6042(a)(2)(H) (the "system must have access at
reasonable times and locations to any resident who is an individual with a
developmental disability in a facility that is providing services to such a
resident"), 10805(a)(3) (a system "shall have access to facilities providing
care and treatment"); 29 U.S.C. § 794e(f)(2) (P&As under PAIR have the same
general authority as under the DD Act).
71 Mississippi Protection & Advocacy Sys., Inc. v. Cotten, No. Civ A. J87-
0503(L), 1989 WL 224953 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 7, 1989) (unpublished opimon),
affid, 929 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1991).
76 Final Judgment at 3, Mississippi Protection & Advocacy Sys., Inc. v.
Cotten, No. Civ A J87-0503(L) (S.D. Miss. Sept. 29, 1989) (on file with the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi in Jackson, Miss.).
7 See id.
78 See id. at 3-5.
79 See Mississippi Protection & Advocacy, Inc. v. Cotten, 929 F.2d 1054,
1059 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Miclugan Protection & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v
Miller, 849 F Supp 1202, 1207-08 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (citing Cotten).
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same clients and the same access issues. 0 To prevent residents from
meeting with P&A attorneys and advocates, the Boswell Center staff
allegedly had been holding residents in closets, placing them in time-outs,
assigning them to disciplinary dormitories, and fabricating guardians'
instructions prohibiting their wards from meeting with the P&A.8 The
second lawsuit was settled in 1996, and the settlement incorporated the
terms of the original judgment, but specified with particularity how the
access right was to be carried out. 2 For example, the original judgment
did not expressly address the P&A's free access to the facility, but the
settlement sets out with great detail how P&A staff can walk throughout
the facility without an escort "for the purposes of talking with resi-
dents." 3 Also, both the judgment and the settlement required the P&A
to give prior notice within a reasonable time before visiting Boswell, 4
but the settlement specified that notice was not required if the P&A had
probable cause to believe a resident was being abused or neglected.
5
The settlement also specified that one hour's notice was sufficient for a
regular visit and one week's notice for an educational visit.8 6
The settlement reiterated that the P&A was to have "access to and the
most effective communication possible" with residents living at the
facility However, unlike the judgment, the settlement listed in great
detail all that tis "commumcation" entailed. For instance, any resident
wanting to speak with a P&A attorney or advocate could do so,. and P&A
attorneys and advocates could meet privately with residents in confiden-
tial locations without explanation to facility staff.8 The settlement also
specified that the P&A could conduct training sessions with all residents
80 See Supplemental Complaint, Mississippi Protection & Advocacy Sys.,
Inc. v Cotten, No. Civ A. 3:87-cv-503LN (S.D. Miss. May 31, 1995) (on file
with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi in Jackson,
Miss.).
81 See id. at 8.
82 See Agreed Judgment, Mississippi Protection & Advocacy Sys., Inc., v
Cotten, No. Civ. A. 3:87-ev-503LN (S.D. Miss. Jan. 11, 1996) (on file with the
U.S. District Court, Southern District of Mississippi in Jackson, Miss.).
83 Id. at 3. The court did require the P&A staff member to notify Boswell's
main desk before changing location from one cottage to another, but without
explanation as to purpose.
84 See Final Judgment at 5; Agreed Judgment at 3.
85 See Agreed Judgment at 4.
16 See Final Judgment at 3; Agreed Judgment at 4.
87 Agreed Judgment at 2.
88 See id.
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regardless of whether the resident had a guardian or other representa-
tive.89
IV THE NEED FOR PARTICULARIZED RULE GUIDANCE
A. The Problem of Unclear Statutory and Rule Guidance
The 1996 settlement in Cotten points to the main reason why basic
access issues have had to be relitigated by P&As over the twenty years
since their inception: vague and inconsistent statutory language, and
vague and nonexistent administrative regulations.9" For instance, in the
Cotten settlement, each element of the original judgment was re-adopted,
but with detailed specifications as to how each P&A right to access was
to be carred out.9 Perhaps the problem stems from the fact that many
DD Act and PAMII Act provisions do not provide adequate guidance;
these highly techmcal provisions are unclear to service providers. 92 And,
although Congress intended that the parallel provisions of the DD and
PAMII Acts be applied in a consistent manner,93 inconsistent provisions
have been used by facilities to argue that P&As have differing or lesser
authority to access under one act than the other.94
89 See id.
9 See Telephone Interview with Gary Gross, supra note 41 (Gross stated
that vagueness has engendered lots of endless litigation and disputes that could
have been avoided with clear authority.); Interview with Ken Zeller, Litigation
Director, Kentucky Protection and Advocacy Division in Frankfort, Ky (Oct. 28,
1996) (Zeller stated that agencies want to see the P&A's authority in "black and
white at 42 C.F.R.").
"' See generally Final Judgment; Agreed Judgment.
92 See COMMENTS ON PROPOSED DD REGULATIONS, supra note 9, at 3.
93 Congress intended for the protection and advocacy functions of all three
programs - PADD, PAMII, and PAIR - to be interpreted consistently with each
other. See COMMENTS ON PROPOSED DD REGULATIONS, supra note 9, at 1, see
also 29 U.S.C. § 509(f)(2) (1994) (stating the P&A under PAIR is to exercise
the same general authority as under the DD Act); S. REP No. 100-113, at 24
(1987) (stating that the authority of P&As under the DD Act to investigate
incidents of abuse and neglect is consistent with PAIMI authority); S. REP. No.
103-120, at 36 (1993) (stating that the P&A's authority under the DD Act to
gain access to people in facilities should be exercised consistent with similar
provisions in PAIMI).
94 See S. REP No. 103-120, at 36 (1993) (stating that although some
individuals have been demed access to P&A because they do not come under
PAIMI, they shall fall within PADD and therefore not be demed access); see also
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For example, unlike the PAMII Act, the DD Act does not explicitly
require access to facilities. The parameters of reasonable access to
people, facilities, and records are not defined by either statute. Neither act
prescribes time frames for production of records. Neither act explains
what constitutes an abuse complaint. The PAMII Act contains an
extensive definition of abuse and neglect,96 while the DD Act contains
none. Neither act addresses P&A standing to pursue judicial remedies.
The PAIR statutes state only that P&A PAIR programs have the same
general authority to access and to pursue protective remedies as P&As do
under the DD Act.97 Thus the DD, PAMII, and PAIR statutes form a
self-referencing circle of unclear provisions.
Further, until the recent promulgation of new DD Regulations" and
the issuance of proposed PAII Regulations,99 little had been done to
provide basic definitions of statutory terms and to clarify the requirements
of the DD Act, the PAMII Act, or the PAIR statutes."10 The former DD
Maryland Disability Law Ctr., Inc. v. Mount Washington Pediatric Hosp., 664
A.2d 16, 26 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (holding that broad PAMII definition of
abuse and neglect did not apply to people with developmental disabilities; thus,
in absence of a DD Act definition, the narrower state definition applied);
Michigan Protection & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v Miller, 849 F Supp. 1202, 1206-
08 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (discussing the Department of Social Services' ("DSS")
unsuccessful argument that because of the difference in the DD and PAMII Act
access provisions, the P&A did not have authority to access DSS training
schools, regional detention facilities, foster care homes for mnors, and a variety
of education and rehabilitative programs because treating mental illness was not
the primary purpose of the DSS facilities).
95 See 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(3)-(4) (PAMII access to facilities and records);
id. § 6042(a)(2)(H)-(I) (DD access to residents and records); S. REP No. 103-
120, at 36 (1993).
96 See 42 U.S.C. § 10802(1), (5) (1994).
9' See 29 U.S.C. § 794e(f)(2).
98 See Developmental Disabilities Program, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,142 (1996) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 1385-88).
" See Requirements Applicable to Protection and Advocacy of Individuals
with Mental Illness, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,367 (1994) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
51).
"o The Adminstration on Developmental Disabilities ("ADD") issued
guidance in the form of Opinion Letters about probable cause determinations
(Feb. 8, 1994 and Oct. 28, 1994), and about P&A's DD Act authority to request
and receive guardian information, to request and receive records of people who
have died under suspicion of abuse and neglect, to monitor facilities, and to
provide training and outreach (Oct. 28, 1994). See Letter from Bob Williams to
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Regulations merely stated that the rights of people with developmental
disabilities should be protected as specified by the DD Act."0' No rules
had been issued under the PAMII Act, and the PAIR Regulations
contained no guidance about access issues.
10 2
B. The New DD Regulations: The Solution to Access Problems?
The new DD Regulations do address some of the major P&A access
issues.'0 3 In its comments accompanying the new regulations, the
Administration on Developmental Disabilities ("ADD") notes that every
effort was made to incorporate similar provisions from the proposed
Ellen M. Saideman, supra note 50; Letter from Bob Williams, Commissioner,
Administration on DevelopmentalDisabilities, to Andrew S. Penn, Attorney with
Maryland Disability Law Center, 1 (Feb. 8, 1994) (agency Advisory Opinion).
The National Institute of Mental Health ("NIMH") issued Opimon Letters
about a P&A's PAMII Act authority and concluded that PAMII did not authorize
P&A access to federal facilities. See Letter from Natalie Reatig, Protection and
Advocacy Coordinator, NIMH, to Mary W Young 1 (Aug. 15, 1989). NIMH
also stated that PAMII did not authorize P&As to request and receive records of
deceased residents without the release of the deceased person's legal guardians.
See Letter from Natalie Reatig, Protection and Advocacy Coordinator, NIMH,
to Chris Lerol, Attorney with Legal Center for People with Disabilities 1 (Dec.
13, 1990); see also Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program v J.S. Tarwater
Developmental Ctr., 894 F Supp. 424, 428 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (discussing a state
law that guardianship of an incapacitated person "terminated upon the death of
the guardian or ward") (emphasis added), aff'd, 97 F.3d 492 (11th Cir. 1996).
However, NIMH did specify that PAIMI programs have general authority to
request and receive access to all records, including investigations prepared by
other agencies. See Letter from Natalie Reatig, Director of Protection and
Advocacy Program, NIMII, to Antoinette Eates, Staff Attorney, Disability
Advocates, Inc. (Nov. 28, 1989).
Although ADD and NIMH's interpretation of the DD and PAMII Acts in
opimon letters is persuasive, the authority of the opimon letters is non-binding.
See Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (stating that an
administrative agency's non-rule interpretation of the statutes it adminsters is
entitled to great weight in a judicial determination, but it is not binding).
Unfortunately, as non-binding authority these opinion letters frequently have had
little impact on facilities denying access to P&As.
'o' See 45 C.F.R. § 1386.30(e)(3) (1995) (prior to proposed rules).
102 See id. pt. 1386, subpart B.
103 See generally Developmental Disabilities Program, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,142
(1996) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 1385-88).
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PAIMI Regulations into the DD Regulations in order to coordinate the
two sets as closely as possible.'0 4 The effort toward rule consistency
should reduce some of the interpretive problems previously caused by
dissimilar provisions.'°5
1. Probable Cause, "Complaint, " and Standing Defined
The new DD Regulations define "probable cause" as "a reasonable
ground for belief that an individual with developmental disabilities has
been, or may be, subject to abuse or neglect,"'0 6 thus clarifying a
P&A's right to take preventative action before abuse or neglect occurs.
The regulations rectify the Tarwater problem' 7 by defining a "com-
plaint" of abuse or neglect to include any "report or communication,
whether formal or informal, written or oral, received by the system
including media accounts, newspaper articles, telephone calls (including
anonymous calls), from any source alleging abuse or neglect of an
individual with a developmental disability"' 0' In addition, the DD
Regulations adopt the broad PAIMI definition of abuse and neglect'0 9
and clearly state that a P&A has standing to take legal action in its own
name to redress rights violations without a showing of injury to it-
self. 0
'4 See zd. at 51,144.
105 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
106 Developmental Disabilities Program, 61 Fed. Reg. at 51,156 (emphasis
added).
107 See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
10' Developmental Disabilities Program, 61 Fed. Reg. at 51,155.
109 See id. ("Abuse means any act or failure to act which was performed
knowingly, recklessly or intentionally and which caused injury mclud[ing]
[v]erbal, nonverbal, mental and emotional harassment; rape use of bodily
or chemical restraints likely to cause immediate harm or result in long
term harm if such practices continue.").
1o See id. at 51,159; see also id. at 51,148 (comments regarding § 1386.25
stating "without showing injury to itself, a P&A does have standing to bnng suit
on behalf of persons with disabilities"). Section 1386.25 addresses the problem
raised in the holding of Association for Retarded Citizens v. Dallas County
Mental Health & Mental Retardation Ctr Bd. of Trustees, 19 F.3d 241, 243-44
(5th Cir. 1994), where the court stated that the federally funded P&A program
did not have standing to file suit on behalf of children with developmental
disabilities against a neighborhood association that had unlawfully discriminated
against the children by preventing the construction of a small group home.
1996-971
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2. New Rule Provision Dealing with Access
Probably the most important change in the DD Regulations is the
addition of a new rule section dealing with access to people with
developmental disabilities, facilities, and records."' As much as possi-
ble, and in accordance with congressional intent that the parallel
provisions of the DD and PAMlI Acts be applied in a consistent
manner," 2 ADD adopted the language of the proposed PAIMI Regula-
tions. 3 The result is specific rule guidance on access that not only
attempts to harmonize existing statutes, case law, and policy, but tries to
clear up the confusion that resulted from differing orgamzational and
structural standards between the DD and PAlMI programs." 4
The new access provision abandons the convoluted technical language
contained in the statute,"' and instead clearly spells out (as do the
proposed PAIMI Regulations) 6 the three bases for P&A access to
Other courts, however, have affirmed P&A standing. See, e.g., Alabama
Disabilities Advocacy Program v J.S. Tarwater Developmental Ctr., 894 F
Supp. 424, 427 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (finding P&A had standing to bring suit for
access to records of deceased facility residents based upon a showing of
injury-m-fact to the P&A, but not reaching the question of whether the federal
statute requires such a showing), affd, 97 F.3d 492 (11th Cir. 1996); Estate of
Witt v Missouri Protection & Advocacy Servs., Inc., 880 S.W.2d 380, 381 (Mo.
1994) (holding that the P&A had standing in its own name to assert the nghts
of its client); Goldstein v Coughlin, 83 F.R.D. 613, 614 (W.D.N.Y 1979)
(holding that the P&A did not need to show mjury to itself to have standing to
sue the New York Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities
on behalf of the P&A's client who had not received habilitative services); see
also Developmental Disabilities Program, 61 Fed. Reg. at 51,148 (comments to
proposed rule to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1386.25).
"' See Developmental Disabilities Program, 61 Fed. Reg. at 51,158-59 (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1386.22).
112 See supra notes 93-102.
113 See Developmental Disabilities Program, 61 Fed. Reg. at 51,147 (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1386.22) ("Language has been included based on the
PAIMI regulations.").
14 See COMMENTS ON PROPOSED DD REGULATIONS, supra note 9, at 5-6.
" See 42 U.S.C. § 6042(a)(2)(H)(I)(i)-(iii) (1994). See supra note 19 for
text of statute.
116 See Requirements Applicable to Protection and Advocacy of Individuals
with Mental Illness, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,367, 64,376 (1994) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. § 51.41).
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records: a P&A client or the client's guardian has authorized access;.1 7
a person with developmental disabilities does not have a legal guardian,
conservator, or other legal representative, or the person's guardian is the
State;" 8 or the P&A has received an abuse complaint or suspects abuse
exists, but the person's guardian will not authorize access." 9 In addi-
tion, the new DD Regulations clarify that P&A access extends to people
who have died or whose whereabouts are unknown.' 20
a. Access to Records
The new provision provides clear standards regarding the scope of
records access, specifically authorizing the P&A to obtain records in any
available format including draft or final versions and handwritten
notes.12 1 The provision further explains P&A access rights to facility
and state agency investigative reports. 2 2 P&As have access to informa-
tion relied upon to prepare the report, such as physical and documentary
evidence, records describing anyone interviewed, and related investigated
findings. 2 1 This provision should thwart agency attempts to refuse or
deny access to investigative records on the basis that the information was
a draft report12 1 or on the basis that state laws regarding the confidenti-
ality of investigative reports preclude P&A access. 21
b. Access to People and Facilities
Finally, the new provisions regarding access to people and facili-
ties 26 clarify that P&As are entitled to private, unaccompanied access
to both private and public facilities for investigation, training, and
momtoring. "'27 If a facility denies a P&A access to any of its people,
"' See Developmental Disabilities Program, 61 Fed. Reg. at 51,158 (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1386.22(a)(1)).
"' See id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1386.22(a)(2)(ii)).
19 See id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1386.22(a)(3)).
120 See id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1386.22(a)(2)).
121 See zd. at 51,155, 51,158 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1386.22(b)).
122 See id. at 51,158 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1386.22(b)(1) & (2)).
'"3 See zd. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1386.22(b)(2)).
124 See COMMENTs ON PROPOSED DD REGULATIONS, supra note 9, at 15.
125 See infra Part IV.C (notes 143-78 and accompanying text).
126 See Developmental Disabilities Program, 61 Fed. Reg. at 51,155, 51,158-
59 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1386.22(f)-(i)).
127 See id. at 51,158.
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programs, or records, the facility must provide the P&A a written
explanation as well as relevant guardian information. 2
V PROBLEMS UNRESOLVED BY THE NEW DD REGULATIONS
A. Who Determines Probable Cause?
Unfortunately, the new DD Regulations do not go far enough in three
key areas. First, the new access provisions, while defining probable
cause,'29 do not specify that the P&A has exclusive authority to make
probable cause determinations. 3 Although ADD's comments to the
proposed rule discussed access within the context of the P&A's determi-
nation of probable cause,"' m the rule itself ADD apparently did not
give the P&A sole authority to make probable cause determinations.
Specifically, in proposed rule comments the ADD stated that the "Act
does not require a judicial or other third party determination of whether
probable cause exists."' However, the proposed definition of probable
cause in the rule speaks only of the "individual" making the determina-
tion rather than referring to the P&A making the probable cause
determination."' Regrettably, this leaves open the possibility of contin-
ued dispute as to whether a judicial or other third party determination is
required.
In addition, the new access provision does not address whether a
P&A can refuse to disclose the basis of a probable cause finding. In its
128 See id. at 51,159 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1386.22(i)).
129 See id. at 51,156 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1386.19) (defining
probable cause as "a reasonable ground for belief that an individual with
developmental disabilities has been, or may be, subject to abuse or neglect. The
individual making such determination may base the decision on reasonable
inferences drawn from hIs or her experience or traimng regarding similar
incidents, conditions or problems that are usually associated with abuse or
neglect.").
130 However, the rules do not give the P&A exclusive authority. See Letter
from Bob Williams to Andrew S. Penn, supra note 100 (stating that "[p]robable
cause to believe that an individual has been subject to abuse or neglect exists
when the State P&A system determines that it is objectively reasonable for a
person to entertain such a belief") (emphasis added).
131 See Developmental Disabilities Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 26,774, 26,778
(1995).
132 Id.
133 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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comments to the DD Regulations, ADD stated that adding confidentiality
language authorizing P&As to refuse to disclose the basis of a probable
cause finding went beyond the authority of the DD Act.3 4 ADD had
initially included such a provision in its proposed rules.' Thus, the
new DD Regulations do not authorize a P&A to refuse to disclose the
nature of the violation it intends to investigate. Tis seems to conflict
with the intent of subsequent rule provisions authorizing P&As to "keep
confidential the names and identity of individuals who report incidents of
abuse and neglect and individuals who furmsh information that forms the
basis for a determination that probable cause exists."'3 6
Perhaps the general confidentiality provisions of the DD Regulations
prohibiting disclosure of any information in a client's record'37 address
this problem. Most assuredly, P&As should not be required to disclose
the substance of any abuse or neglect report or the basis of any probable
cause determination, since to do so would compromise the "effectiveness
and integrity" ' of the P&A's investigation. Therefore, the only logical
way to harmonize the new rule with previous administrative guidance is
to assume the general confidentiality provisions suffice.
B. What Are the Time Frames for Compliance with P&A Production
Requests?
The second problematic area in the new DD Regulations concerns an
unaddressed aspect of access to records: time frames for agency
compliance with P&A production requests and exclusion from review of
certain quality control documents. Certainly delays in producing records
requested by the P&A increase the likelihood that facilities will "conceal
evidence, change medical records, coordinate stones among witnesses
and/or impose a code of silence upon staff."'3 9 Because delays seriously
undermine enforcement efforts, time frames for agency compliance with
P&A access requests should have been included in the new rule section
,' See Developmental Disabilities Program, 61 Fed. Reg. at 51,147
... See Developmental Disabilities Program, 60 Fed. Reg. at 26,786
(proposed 45 C.F.R. § 1386.21(c)(4)).
136 Developmental Disabilities Program, 61 Fed. Reg. at 51,158 (to be
codified at 45 C.F.P,. § 1386.22(e)(3)).
... See id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1386.22(e)(1)). The provision does
allow disclosure to parents and guardians, unless precluded by state law. See id.
.38 Letter from Bob Williams to Andrew S. Penn, supra note 100, at 1.
139 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE P&A SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 8.
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dealing with access to facilities, records, and people with developmental
disabilities.
Unfortunately, as the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Mexico noted m Robbins v. Budke,"4° "delays may prevent [a] P&A
from acting within prescribed deadlines or may cause a violation of rights
to go unaddressed until it is too late to remedy ""' The failure of the
new DD Regulations to address what constitutes timely production
compliance will allow facilities to foot-drag and may again force P&As
toward time-consuming litigation while crucial evidence is lost.'42
C. Potential Exemption from Disclosure for Medical Peer Review
Records
The third problematic area concerns access to medical peer review
records. The new DD Regulations incorporate the non-exhaustive list of
records a P&A may access14 3 that is also found in the proposed PAIMI
Regulations. 44 Generally, the list in the rule is broad. It explicitly
states that P&A access extends to draft and final reports, 45 reports
of any agency charged with investigating abuse, neglect, injury, or
death,'4 6 and certain internal quality control documents.'47 However,
the new regulations appear to permit exclusion of medical peer review
records by stating the rule does not "preempt State law protection
[for] records produced by medical care evaluation or peer review
committees."' 48
'40 Robbins v Budke, 739 F Supp. 1479 (D.N.M. 1990).
141 Id. at 1488.
142 The National Association of Public Advocacy Systems suggested the
following time frames for granting access: "access shall be provided within three
days; in cases where the [P&A System] determines that compelling or emergency
circumstances warrant, such access shall be provided within 24 hours."
COMMENTS ON PROPOSED DD REGULATIONS, supra note 9, at 15.
141 See Developmental Disabilities Program, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,142, 51,157
(1996) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1386.22).
' See Requirements Applicable to Protection and Advocacy of Individuals
with Mental Illness, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,367, 64,376 (1994) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. § 51.41).
"' See Developmental Disabilities Program, 61 Fed. Reg. at 51,158 (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1386.22(b)).
146 See id. (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1386.22(b)(2)).
'4 See id. (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1386.22(c)(1)-(2)).
148 Id. (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1386.22(c)(1).
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1. State Statutes Address Private
Litigation, Not Investigations
The rule is misleading because, for the most part, these state statutes
primarily exclude medical peer review records from pre-trial discovery
m civil damages suits, '49 not from governmental entities conducting an
But cf. Order on the Petition for Release of Records Under 42 U.S.C.
Section 10801, Disability Rights Ctr., Inc. v Brodeur, 96-E-251 (N.H. Super.
Ct., Jan. 26, 1997). Under its PAMII Act authority, the Disability Rights Center
(the New Hampshire P&A) sought quality assurance records from a pnson's
medical psychiatric unit. The P&A established probable cause on the basis of the
written report of a psychiatrist hired by New Hampshire's State Division of
Mental Health and Developmental Services to review the prison's clinical
operations at the psychiatric unit. Both the doctor's report and referrals received
by the P&A indicated that the prison psychiatric unit merely housed prisoners
with mental illness, rather than treating them. Id. at 4-5.
The prison argued that PAMII prohibits access to quality assurance records
because it limits P&A access to the "records of individuals" only; thus, the P&A
had no nght to the quality assurance records of an institution. Rejecting that
argument, the court found that the investigatory power granted by PAMII to
P&As is much broader. Id. at 10-12. The court concluded that access to quality
assurance records was essential for the P&A to "ensure that the rights of
individuals with mental illness are protected." Id. at 10. The court noted,
however, that the New Hampshire statute that generally prevented disclosure of
quality assurance records also allowed for their discretionary release. Id. at 12.
149 See Charles David Creech, Comment, The Medical Review Committee
Pnvilege:A Jurisdictional Survey, 67 N.C. L. REV 179, 180 (1988) (stating that
one of the purposes of peer review statutes is "to protect the 'proceedings of a
medical review committee, the records and materials it produces and the
materials it considers' from discovery or introduction as evidence at trial"); see,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-21-8 (1990) (saying medical quality assurance records
"shall not be subject to discovery or introduction in evidence in any civil action
against a health care professional or institution") (emphasis added); CAL. EVD.
CODE. § 1157 (West 1995) (stating medical peer review records shall not be
subject to discovery); N.Y EDUC. LAW § 6527(3) (McKinney 1985 & Supp.
1997) (stating that medical review records are not subject to disclosure under
New York's civilpractice rules) (emphasis added); TEx. REv Civ STAT. ANN.
§ 5.06 (Vernon Supp. 1997) (expressing that medical peer review committee
records are confidential, and not to be used in civilproceedings unless a judge
predetermines they are relevant to a civil rights or anticompetitive action);
WASH. REV CODE. § 4.24.250 (1994) (stating "[t]he proceedings, reports, and
written records of [medical peer review committees] shall not be subject to
subpoena or discovery proceedings in any civil action").
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investigation.15 0 Generally, these statutes are aimed directly at malprac-
On the other hand, some states specifically exclude discovery of medical
peer review records from both civil and administrative actions. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. § 766.101(5), (7) (West Supp. 1997) (excluding use of peerreview records
in civil and administrative actions, except m an administrative proceeding by the
Department of Professional Regulation as background information m preparing
its case against medical professionals); KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 311.377(2)
(Banks-Baldwin 1986) (excluding use of peer review records in civil and
admimstrativeproceedings, exceptm disciplinaryproceedings iitiatedby county
boards of health). These provisions, however, still may not operate to preclude
P&A access since an investigation conducted by the P&A "may conceivably
neither culminate in [administrative or civil] litigation, nor be mitially designed
to inspire it." Arnett v. Dal Cielo, 923 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996). Further, in the case
of the Kentucky P&A, a different Kentucky law appears to provide for disclosure
of peer review documents by government-run facilities to P&As. The Kentucky
P&A is a state agency P&A, and thus part of Kentucky state government. See
infra Part VII (notes 179-98 and accompanying text). See KY REV STAT. ANN.
§ 61.878(5) (Banks-Baldwin 1995) (providing for the "shanng of information
between public agencies when the exchange is serving a legitimate governmental
need or is necessary in the performance of a legitimate government function");
see also 91 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 22 (1991) (stating that exchange of investigation-
al information between Kentucky agencies and the Kentucky P&A is necessary
for the P&A to carry out its protection and advocacy functions).
ISO See, e.g., Arnett, 923 P.2d at 12-14. The California Supreme Court held
that an adminstrative agency's request for peer review in its investigation was
not "discovery" and therefore was not excluded under its statute excluding
medical peer review from discovery. Nor was the investigation a "civil action."
Id. at 14. The court noted that to interpret the words otherwise would result in
an "inference [that] is strained." Id., see also Arnett v Pearce, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d
593, 599-600 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that statute excluding medical peer
review records from discovery does not apply to a governmental pre-adjudicatory
investigation); People v. Superior Court (Memorial Med. Ctr.), 286 Cal. Rptr.
478, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that statute excluding medical peer review
records from discovery does not apply to criminal investigations); Commissioner
of Health Servs. v Kadish, 554 A.2d 1097 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that
Connecticut's statutory privilege pertaining to medical peer review records is
limited to civil actions against health care providers and does not apply to an
administrative investigation); Mercy Hosp. v Department of Prof'l Regulation,
467 So. 2d. 1058, 1059 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that, under the former
FLA. STAT. § 768.4(4), an administrative disciplinary investigation is not a civil
action, thus government investigators could access the hospital's peer review
committee reports and records); cf. Humana Hosp. Desert Valley v. Superior
Court, 742 P.2d 1382, 1389 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing in dicta that, even
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tice actions,"5 ' and were enacted after Congress passed the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act. 52 Congress' stated purpose m passing the
Act was to "provide incentive and protection"' 53 for physicians through
peer review to improve the quality of medical care without the "threat of
private money damage liability , 154 Thus, the purpose of the medical
peer review statutes is to "balance the needs of plaintiffs in a civil action
against the needs of health care facilities"'55 to improve health care by
peer review of standard operating procedures and medical staff perfor-
mance.
Conversely, when a P&A investigates abuse or neglect, the distinction
between private and public purpose that exists between a civil litigant and
an institution does not exist. A facility's medical peer review process and
the P&A's investigatory process both serve the public welfare. There is
an "overwhelming public interest' ' 5 6 in protecting people with develop-
mental disabilities from medical neglect just as there is in protecting the
in civil proceedings, "[w]hile the internal workings and deliberative processes of
regularly constituted committees are immune from discovery, the effect of the
proceedings is not." But see Scripps Memorial Hosp. v Superior Court, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 725, 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (excepting medical peer review records
sought to impeach a defense expert from discovery in a criminal prosecution).
'' See, e.g., Memorial Med. 0r., 286 Cal. at 485 (explaining that the state
statute was enacted to prevent production of peer review records in malpractice
actions); Memorial Hosp. v Brownwood Reg'l Med. Ctr., 927 S.W.2d 1, 3-4
(Tex. 1996) (stating that the intent of the Texas Legislature in enacting its peer
review statute was to shield peer review records from discovery in civil damages
suits); see also Creech, supra note 149, at 180.
This does not mean, however, that the peer review statutes are only limited
to medical malpracticeactions. See, e.g., Holly v Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 220-21
(Fla. 1984) (declaring that the peer review discovery privilege pertains to other
civil actions, including defamation); Atkins v Walker, 445 N.E.2d 1132, 1136
(Ohio 1981) (stating that the peer review discovery privilege extends to other
civil actions, including libel and slander).
152 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1994); see also Creech, supra note 149,
at 180.
,13 42 U.S.C. § 11101(5).
'"4 Id. § 11101(4). The provision has been interpreted to include "qualified
immunity from damages for those who participate in peer review activities."
Austin v McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 733 (9th Cir. 1992).
155 Creech, supra note 149, at 180. For an in-depth analysis of peer review
procedures and legal effects, see generally zd.
156 Mercy Hosp. v Department of Prof 1 Regulation, 467 So. 2d 1058, 1060
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
985
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
general "consuming health care public from treatment by unqualified
physicians."' 57
2. Deficient Medical Care
Remains a Leading Cause of Injury
Therefore, access to peer review information is extremely important
m both state and private facilities, as well as hospitals where patients'
medical care may be out-sourced. Recent studies show that deficient
medical and psychiatric care continues to be one of the leading causes of
serious injury, Irreversible physical degeneration, and death for people
with disabilities residing in facilities.'
For example, in an investigation conducted by the United States
Department of Justice, a resident who had moderate mental retardation
"suffered massive brain damage and lost the ability to walk and talk due
to staff failure to provide emergency care in response to a life-threatening
seizure."' 59 In another facility, a resident was found with an "infestation
of maggots and bloody drainage from her ear."'' 6 The Justice Depart-
ment found that some of the most common and serious problems resulted
from inadequate diagnosis and treatment of illness and inappropriate use
of psychotropic medications. 6' Ths type of neglect is recurrent 62
and of the very sort that peer review records might uncover.
157 Id.
158 See OVERSIGHT OF INSTITUTIONS, supra note 25, §§ 1, 3.2; see also
Sundram, supra note 17, at 11. In types of problems reported m the P&As'
annual reports for 1991 and 1992, the biggest problem areas reported included
"failure to provide necessary medical or mental health treatment," id., and
inappropriate treatment, which included "failure to provide an appropriate
physical or mental diagnosis and a written treatment plan, the use of inappropri-
ate or excessive medications, and failure to provide for personal care, privacy
and/or confidentiality." Id.
1' OVERSIGHT OF INSTITUTIONS, supra note 25, § 3.2.
160 Id.
161 See Id.
162 See id. § 5.2 ("Although state survey agencies almost always certify that
serious deficiencies have been corrected, they subsequently cite many institutions
for the same violations."). Between 1990 and 1995, state Medicaid inspections
cited 33 large public institutions for violating treatment standards at least once
within three years of a previous citation. Twenty institutions were cited for
violating the same standards on one or more consecutive inspections. See id.
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3. The Exemption May Allow Facilities to Hide Records
The new regulation appears to open the way for facilities and
hospitals to hide information they should otherwise disclose to the P&A
by sending it to a "medical care evaluation or peer review" commit-
tee. 63 While most state statutes provide that medical facilities may not
hide information simply by sending it to a review committee, "[t]reatment
vanes [ 1 regarding documents produced indirectly as a result of activities
involving or performed at-the direction of a medical review commit-
tee.
164
P&As have already been engaged in pointless and time-consuming
disputes with facilities that use state privacy restrictions to withhold
records other than those seemingly protected by state statute. 65 Facili-
ties have wrongfully argued that any document or information provided
to the peer review committee is privileged, including medical records and
incident reports.' 66 The failure of the new rule provision to deal more
specifically with state statutes, 67 or at least clanfy that only documents
clearly generated by such committees constitute peer review records, may
have created a mechamsm whereby facilities can "shield from review an
endless variety and quantity of documents by simply handing them over
to a peer review committee.'
168
4. The Exemption Is Not Permitted by the P&A Statutes
More importantly, neither the DD Act nor the PAMII Act contains a
statutory provision authorizing state preemption of federal law In fact,
163 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEMS
COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES' NOTICE OF
PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO THE PROTEC-
TION AND ADVOCACY FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS PROGRAM 18
[heremafter NAPAS COMMENTS ON PAIMI REGULATIONS].
' Creech, supra note 149, at 184.
165 SeeNAPAS COMMENTS ON PAIMI REGULATIONS, supra note 163, at 18.
166 See id.
167 In the introductory matter to the 1991 PAMII Amendments, Congress
contemplated a very narrow exception for peer review records set up by a
hospital (not a facility) as part of the hospital's accreditationrequirements by the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care. See S. REP No. 102-114, at
5 (1991). Congress did not change the language of the PAMII Act to reflect its
expressed intent, however.
168 NAPAS COMMENTS ON PAIMI REGULATIONS, supra note 163, at 18.
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the regulation contradicts the DD Act's provision that state law should
not be used to restrict P&A access to records.'69 Both federal and state
courts have held that the DD Act preempts state law when it restricts
access granted by the Act.170
Apparently, HHS' reason for promulgating the rule is its misplaced
reliance on congressional discussions surrounding the 1991 PAMII
amendments. 7 ' Although Congress indicated its intent that the PAMII
Act not override state peer review disclosure statutes,172 the exemption
Congress intended to recognize was a narrow exception 173 to state peer
review statutes enacted for hospital, not institutional, compliance with the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care accreditation
requirements.
174
Congress, however, did not amend the PAMII Act to include state
preemption of P&A access as a requirement. Nor did Congress amend the
DD Act to limit P&A access to peer review records.17 ' Absent some
statutory authority to restrict P&A access, the Department of Health and
Human Services cannot thus circumvent the P&A mandate. The
"determintive question" is not what HHS thnks it should do, but what
Congress has specifically said it can do.1 76 Because "[a]ny authority
169 See 42 U.S.C. § 6042(g) (1994).
170 See Oklahoma Disability Law Ctr., Inc. v Dillon Family & Youth Servs.,
Inc., 879 F Supp. 1110, 1112 (N.D. Okla. 1995) (explaining that under the
PAMII Act, federal law preempts state law requiring a court order to obtain
records); West Virginia Advocates, Inc. v. Appalachian Community Health Ctr.,
Inc., 447 S.E.2d 606, 611 (W Va. 1994). (stating that § 6042(g) "evinces a
congressional intent that access to records of developmentally disabled
individuals be governed by federal law").
17' Requirements Applicable to Protection and Advocacy of Individuals with
Mental Illness, 59 Fed. Reg. at 64,371 (discussing section 51.41(c)).
172 See S. REP No. 102-114, at 5 (1991).
173 See NAPAS COMMENTS ON PAIMI REGULATIONS, supra note 163, at 18.
'74 See S. REP No. 102-114, at 5 (1991).
The committee recognizes that almost all hospitals have established
medical care evaluation or peer review committees as part of their Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations ("JCAHO")
accreditation requirements. It is the Committee's intent that the
PAMII Act does not preempt State law regarding disclosure of peer
review/medical review records relating to the proceedings of such
committees.
Id.
,71 Congress never articulated the intention that, under the DD Act, P&A
access to peer review records should be restricted.
176 See Civil Aeronautics Bd. v Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 322
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delegated or granted to an administrative agency is necessarily limited to
the terms of the delegating statute,""' HHS may not limit P&A access
and circumvent the requirements of the DD and PAMII Acts. 78
VI. OTHER APPROACHES TO ACCESS PROBLEMS
A. Independent State P&As
It is worth noting that some of the P&A programs that have had the
fewest access problems are the independent state agency P&As in states
which had the foresight to pass strong state legislation clearly setting out
the state authority of the P&A to fulfill its mandate.'79 Kentucky is one
of thirteen states with an independent state agency running a P&A
program. 80 Kentucky structurally placed its P&A within the state
public defender office, the Department of Public Advocacy,'"' but
operationally the P&A is independent of the Public Advocate.'
82
Few of the access problems have been experienced by the Kentucky
Protection and Advocacy Division. This is probably because the Kentucky
P&A has a clear Kentucky statutory mandate' 3 setting forth its authori-
ty to pursue "legal, administrative, and other appropriate remedies to
insure the protection of the rights of the developmentally disabled."'
8 4
(1961).
1'7 Sealed Air Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976, 993
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (Nies, J., concurring and dissenting).
178 See Lyng v Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986) (stating "an agency's power
is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress"); Killip v. Office of
Personnel Management, 991 F.2d 1564, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating "[a]ny and
all authority pursuant to which an agency may act ultimately must be grounded
in an express grant from Congress").
'9See Telephone Interview with Barbara Cotter, supra note 40.
o See generally Sundram, supra note 17, at 7 (stating that only 13 states
have independent government P&As). Private non-profit corporations provide
P&A services m the remaining 43 states and territories. See id. The DD Act
requires a state's P&A to be independent from service providers but not from
state government. See 42 U.S.C. § 6042(a)(2)(G) (1994).
181 SeeKY. REv STAT. ANN. §§ 31.010(2), 31.030(9) (Banks-Baldwin 1991).
182 See Interview with Ken Zeller, supra note 90.
183 See 91 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 22, at 3 (1991) (stating the Kentucky P&A
is authonzed under state and federal law to "protect and advocate the rights
of children and adults with developmental disabilities and mental health prob-
lems").
,' 83 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 48, at 3 (1983).
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Although the Kentucky P&A's course has not been entirely free of access
problems, its authority as a state agency,18 5 its use of inter-agency
agreements, 86 and receipt of favorable attorney general opinions "'87
regarding its authority have combined to basically eradicate access
problems.'
In large measure, the Kentucky P&A's stature as a government entity
assures its access to people, facilities, facility employees, and records." 9
Yet one of the concerns regarding the efficacy of governmental P&As is
whether they can be truly independent 9 ' and withstand political pres-
sure either to not initiate an investigative action or to prematurely resolve
an investigation that should be litigated. 9'
185 See Interview with Ken Zeller, supra note 90; Interview with Kathryn
Dutton-Mitchell, Attorney, PAIMI Program, Kentucky Protection and Advocacy
Division in Frankfort, Ky. (Oct. 28, 1996).
186 See, e.g., Interagency Agreement Between the Kentucky Cabinet for
Human Resources Department for Mental Health and Mental Retardation
Services, Department of Social Services and the Kentucky Department of
Education and the Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy, Protection and
Advocacy Division 2 (Aug. 1993) (specifying the process for prompt access to
all records "pertinent to applications for emergency respite or institutional
placement of school-aged children").
187 See, e.g., 91 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 22, at 3 (1991) (unpublished opinion)
(stating that the Kentucky P&A is authorized under state and federal law to
"protect and advocate the rights of children and adults with developmental
disabilities and mental health problems"); 84 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 300 (Aug. 17,
1984) (unpublished opimon) (successfully challenging charges by another agency
for records as excessive). But cf. 93 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 48 (Feb. 7, 1983)
(unpublished opinon) (holding that when "acting only on behalf of an individual
who desires access to [abuse] records wuch are unavailable to hun because of
a confidentiality statute," the Kentucky P&A may be demed access).
188 See Interview with Ken Zeller, supra note 90; Interview with Kathryn
Dutton-Mitchell, supra note 185.
189 See Interview with Kathryn Dutton-Mitchell, supra note 185.
190 See 42 U.S.C. § 6042(a)(2)(G) (1994) (saying that the protection and
advocacy system must be independent from service providers).
' ' See Interview with Ken Zeller, supra note 90. Mr. Zeller acknowledged
that the Kentucky P&A sometimes faces a "subtle pressure to negotiate
exclusively" with other agencies, rather than pursue litigation. The Public
Protection and Regulation Cabinet, however, has consistently supported P&A
independence, even though changes in the administration sometimes necessitate
a brief re-education penod about P&A authority and independence. See id.
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For tus reason, the National Association of Protection and Advocacy
Systems ("NAPAS") 92 has urged some governmental P&As to become
pnvate non-profit corporations. 93 But the Kentucky P&A has chosen
to remain in state government and has successfully maintained its
independence,' using its position as a state agency to effectively
investigate and redress individual rights violations'95 and effect systemic
changes.'96 Additionally, as a governmental entity, the Kentucky P&A
192 NAPAS is a voluntary membership association for P&As that provides
training and technical assistance to P&A staff and represents P&A interests
before Congress, as well as the executive branch.
'93 See Interview with Kathryn Dutton-Mitchell, supra note 185.
194 See Interview with Ken Zeller, supra note 90; Interview with Kathryn
Dutton-Mitchell, supra note 185; see, e.g., Deborah Yetter, State Lags on
Improvements at Juvenile Centers Changes Were Promised Nine Months Ago,
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 3, 1996, at Al (P&A monitors
consent decree between United States Justice Department and Commonwealth of
Kentucky regarding juvenile facilities); Gil Lawson, State Sued Over Health
Screeningsfor Children, COURIER-JOURNAL (Lomsville, Ky.), May 15, 1996, at
BI (P&A sues Kentucky Medicaid Agency and seeks class action status because
only eight percent of eligible children with developmental disabilities receive
preventative care required by federal law); Deborah Yetter, Report Finds Flaws
in State Probes of Abuse; But Notes Cabinet Has Made Progress, COURIER-
JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Aug. 26, 1995, at Al (P&A issues report criticizing
Division of Licensing and Regulation for taking months to complete abuse
investigations and remove abusive employees); Beverly Bartlett, Testing Students
for Disabilities Often Lags: Parents Fear Children May Be Missing Out on the
Help TheyNeed, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Feb. 5, 1995, at Al (P&A
states Jefferson County School Board's non-compliance with federal educational
requirements for students with disabilities is unacceptable and illegal).
'9- See Interview with Ken Zeller, supra note 90; Interview with Kathryn
Dutton-Mitchell, supra note 185.
196 See Interview with Ken Zeller, supra note 90; Interview with Kathryn-
Dutton Mitchell, supra note 185. Both Ms. Dutton-Mitchell and Mr. Zeller
emphasizedthe effectiveness of policing the first-line investigators to ensure they
are promptly and thoroughly investigating abuse and neglect. By reviewing
reports and statistical analysis, the Kentucky P&A frequently uncovers patterns
of abuse that would otherwise go unaddressed.
Although the Office of Inspector General Licensing and Regulation Division
("L&R") is charged with first-line investigations of abuse and neglect mcidents
which occur in state facilities, L&R on its own initiative has never made public
any of its investigative findings. For the past three years, the Kentucky P&A has
evaluated L&R's abuse and neglect investigations using both statistical analysis
and case studies to determine how long it takes L&R to respond to an abuse and
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enjoys a level of access to Kentucky lawmakers that enables it to achieve
an impressive level of legislative advocacy '
Although becoming an independent state agency could permanently
solve the access difficulties of non-profit P&As, it might create more
problems than it solves in states that have proven to be particularly
hostile to their P&As. 98 On the other hand, a state statute accurately
neglect complaint and to fully investigate the incident. See generally COMMON-
WEALTH OF KENTUCKY, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY, PROTECTION AND
ADVOCACY INVESTIGATION REPORT (1994) [hereinafter 1994 KENTUCKY P&A
INVESTIGATION REPORT]; COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC ADVOCACY, ABUSE AND NEGLECT INVESTIGATIONS IN STATE OWNED
AND OPERATED CARE AND TREATMENT FACILITIES (1995) [hereinafter 1995
KENTUCKY P&A INVESTIGATION REPORT]; COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY, ABUSE AND NEGLECT INVESTIGATIONS IN
STATE OWNED AND OPERATED CARE AND TREATMENT FACILITIES THIRD
REVIEW (1996) [hereinafter 1996 KENTUCKY P&A INVESTIGATION REPORT].
For example, at one facility the Kentucky P&A discovered that L&R had
investigated a large number of broken bones every year - 18 in 1993, 28 in
1994, and 34 in 1995 - all from "unknown origin." 1996 KENTUCKY P&A
INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra at 5. L&R not only failed to substantiate as abuse
any of the 80 broken bones, it also failed to find the facility neglectful. See id.
"From facts such as [these], as well as [the Kentucky P&A's] other statistical
findings, the [P&A has] concludedthat individuals m Kentucky's public facilities
do not have adequate safeguards ensuring their right to safety, and that the
Cabinet for Health Services and L&R, themselves, are neglectful." Letter from
Kathryn Dutton-Mitchell, Attorney, PAIMI Program, Kentucky Protection and
Advocacy Division, to Melissa Bowman (December 13, 1996) (on file with
author); see also 1994 KENTUCKY P&A INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra at 34-40;
1995 KENTUCKY P&A INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra at i-u; 1996 KENTUCKY
P&A INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra at 9. The Kentucky P&A's specific
recommendations for systemic changes that would create adequate safeguards
against abuse and neglect have largely been incorporated in the Consent Decree
entered into by the Commonwealth of Kentucky as a result of suit by the United
States Department of Justice under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act ("CRIPA"). See id. at 9; see also CRIPA, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349
(1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997, 1997a-j (1994)).
... See Interview with Kathryn Dutton-Mitchell, supra note 185; Telephone
Interview with Ken Zeller, supra note 90. All Kentucky agencies participate in
a bill review and comment process. Frequently, the legislature assigns bills
affecting people with disabilities to the P&A. In addition, P&As have direct
access to legislators and various committees concerning the problems of people
with disabilities. See id.
'9' For example, the Alabama P&A, although part of the Umversity of
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proclaiming the parameters of P&A access could do much to facilitate
access requests.
B. Penalties for a State's Violation of Access Requirements
Another possible way to halt state non-compliance with P&A access
statutes would be for HHS to begin penalty proceedings against the
defiant state. Withdrawal of federal funding is the penalty for a state's
violation of any provision of the DD or PAMII Acts.199 Although it
would seem that a cessation of funding would be a sigificant incentive
for states to comply with P&A access requirements, the remedy, if
enforced, ultimately would work to the detriment of people with
disabilities.200 Suspending or terminating funding could further com-
Alabama School of Law, has no state statute laying out its P&A authority. Thus,
battles for access, like the one with the J.S. Tarwater Developmental Center, are
routine rather than exceptional. See Telephone Interview with Barbara Cotter,
supra note 40.
199 For example, under the DD Act, a state's "[f]ailure to comply with State
plan requirements[,]" which include all the statutory and rule access require-
ments, "may result in loss of Federal Funds" under 45 U.S.C. § 6027 See 42
C.F.R. § 1386.30(b); see also Requirements Applicable to Protection and
Advocacy of Individuals with Mental Illness, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,367, 64,374 (1994)
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 51.10). The regulations explain that a state's
failure to:
satisfy any other requirement of the [PAMII] Act, the regulations, or
other requirements may be considered a breach of the terms and
conditions of the grant award and may require remedial action such as
the suspension or termination of an active grant, withholding of
payments or converting to a reimbursement method of payment.
Id.
200 As stated before, states institute P&As in order to receive millions of
dollars m federal financial assistance to provide services for people with
disabilities. These momes are used to provide food, shelter, medical treatment,
physical and occupational therapy, educational services and assistive technology
to people with disabilities. Obviously, a cessation of federal funding would strike
a real blow to the daily welfare of many people with disabilities.
Thus, although stoppage of funding is the statutory pumshment for a state's
non-compliance with the DD and PAMII Acts, HHS has never exacted this
penalty upon a state. It did, however, partially withhold funding from the
troubled and grossly mismanaged Washington, D.C., P&A ("IPACHI"), causing
the P&A to close and thus leaving indigent people with disabilities few options
for free legal assistance. See Stephanie Mencmer, Agency Is Closed, Case Isn 't;
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
promise the care of people residing in both institutions and community
facilities.2"'
Therefore, because the DD Act and the PAMIT Act expressly
authorize only the withdrawal of funds, HHS should explore the
possibility that the statutes impliedly authorize other methods of
enforcement. For example, the proposed PAIMI Regulations frame a
state's noncompliance with any of the provision of the PAMII Act,
including access requirements, as a "breach of the terms and condi-
tions of the [state's] grant award."202 This provision implies that
the federal funding agency could sue a state for breach of contract
and damages for refusing to comply with the DD and PAMII Acts access
requirements.2 °3
IPACHI's Demise: Advocacy Group for Disabled Accused of Shoddy Practices,
LEGAL TIMEs, Oct. 9, 1995, at 1. Despite the lack of protection and advocacy
services, Washingtonians with disabilities then asked the federal government to
withhold nearly one million dollars in federal financial assistance from the
District because they did not believe the money would be well spent if a better
P&A were not designated. See Cindy Loose, Advocatesfor Disabled Want Funds
Withheld; District Agency Is Unqualified, They Say, WASH. POST, July 24, 1996,
at F03.
201 Cf. OVERSIGHT OF INSTITUTIONS, supra note 158, § 5.2. Discussing
sanctions under Medicaid for preventing recurring rights violations at large
intermediate care facilities for people with mental retardation ("ICFs/MR"), the
Government Accounting Office arrived at a similar conclusion:
[S]anctions available to the states under Medicaid have not always been
effective in preventing recurring violations and are rarely used against
large public ICFs/MR. Only two possible sanctions are available
suspension - that is, denial of Medicaid reimbursement for new
admissions - or termination from the program. [T]ermmating a
large institution from the Medicaid program is counterproductive
because denying federal funds may further compromise the care of those
in the institution.
Id. § 5.2.
202 Requirements Applicable to Protection and Advocacy of Individuals with
Mental Illness, 59 Fed. Reg. at 64,374 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 51.10).
203 Although neither the DD Act nor PAMII Act explicitly provides for this
remedy, it is well-settled that an agency may sue if it has an interest, such as a
contract right, that warrants an implicit grant of authority. See United States v.
Mattson, 600 F.2d 1295, 1297 (9th Cir. 1979) (Mattson was a pre-Civil Rights
of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA") case holding that the U.S. Attorney
General did not have the requisite governmental interest to sue under the DD Act
on behalf of residents living in an unsanitary and unsafe Montana facility.).
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Alternatively, HHS could seek injunctive relief against a non-
complying state.2 It would require many resources, however, for the
federal government to monitor an order for injunctive relief against the
state. Moreover, if the state refused to comply with an injunction,
pursuing civil contempt actions and jailing governmental officials could
prove costly, time-consuming, and ultimately impracticable. Despite these
challenges, there is a pressing need for meaningful penalties that would
do no more harm to people with disabilities than the state is already
doing by its non-compliance with P&A access provisions.
CONCLUSION
On the whole, the new DD Regulations are a big step forward in
defining the parameters of P&A access. Although the regulations still
leave some areas open to dispute, they have done much to clarify the
P&A investigative process and the right to access by defimng what
constitutes a "complaint" of abuse and explainng when the P&A has
"probable cause" to act. The DD Regulations' new access provision is
fairly successful m harmonizing statutes, case law, and policy to lay out
the parameters of P&A access to investigate complaints, momtor
facilities, and meet with people residing in facilities, as well as facility
staff.
Unfortunately, the regulations do not specify that the P&A has
exclusive authority to make probable cause determinations and the right
to refuse disclosure on the basis of a probable cause finding. The new
regulations do not set time limits for facility compliance with records
production requests, thus keeping the door open for continued disputes
over the timeliness of a facility's response. Finally, the regulations lay out
a possible exemption from disclosure for medical peer review records,
thus creating the real possibility that facilities will try to hide information
by sending it to peer review committees.
Thus, although the new DD Regulations are a good attempt at
resolving P&A access problems, they leave three areas open for dispute.
Therefore, P&As probably will continue to divert resources into battling
procedural issues instead of performing substantive advocacy The
regulations should, however, ensure that old battles need not be fought
again, which is indeed good news for P&As and the people whose rights
they defend.
204 See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690 (1978).

